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1. Introduction 
Constitutional theory builds bridges to democratic theory and to sociological concepts such as 
identity and citizenship. However, as far as it is concerned with democratic procedure, it has 
mainly focused on democratic electoral representation and aggregating interests. At the same 
time it has neglected the question of the role of expertise and knowledge in policy-making. 
Political science and regulatory literature, as well as science and technology (STS) literature, 
have increasingly paid attention to expertise in policy-making while policy-makers 
themselves have developed discourses and procedures aiming at “sound evidence” and 
“scientific expertise”. However, the exact relation between knowledge and democracy, and 
between the aggregation of evidence and the aggregation of interests requires still further 
normative investigation. 
 In relation to the EU, the multi-level constitutionalism debate has reflected about 
sovereignty, democratic design, identity, and citizenship beyond the nation state, but again 
paid little attention to the role of expertise and knowledge in European governance. Yet, 
debates about the place of (scientific) expertise and sound evidence have emerged in other 
parts of the literature, and among policy makers, in particular from the mid 1990s onwards, 
and have intensified since the 2000s. However, arguments about expertise have been patchy 
and been made in relation to particular institutional settings. More holistic arguments about 
the place of expertise in democratic governance, in a way one would ideally expect from a 
constitutionalism perspective, have been rarely made. Moreover, different strands of the 
literature have focused on different institutional settings of European governance. Hence, 
arguments about expertise are rarely “cross-referenced”.  
 In this chapter I will first place the debate on multi-level constitutionalism within the 
context of a wider tendency in EU studies to focus on the aggregation of interests and the 
way the EU’s institutional set-up accommodates national diversity rather than on how 
expertise is channelled and functional diversity accommodated. I will then investigate further 
those parts of the literature, beyond constitutionalism, which have dealt with the role of 
expertise and knowledge in European governance, and set out three dimensions along which 
these parts of the literature differ from each other. 
 The following two sections analyse how arguments about expertise and knowledge 
have been framed specifically in relation to different European governance mechanisms. 
Debates on expertise have developed in relation to three institutional settings in particular, 
namely, European agencies, integrated impact assessments, and the open method of 
coordination (OMC). Section 3 deals with the debates on both agencies and impact 
assessments (IAs). These debates emerged at different moments in time, and the debate on 
IAs picked up where the one on agencies had left off, and more particularly extended the 
discussion on expertise from the implementation stage to the legislative stage. Despite their 
differences, these two debates have much in common, both in relation to their inspirational 
origin, and the “rational technical” approach to conceiving the place of expertise in 
governance, relying mainly on a traditional understanding of democracy focused on 
aggregating interests via parliament. The debate on the OMC instead is very different in 
nature. Section 4 analyses how arguments on expertise and democratic accountability have 
been made in relation to the OMC, both in the (normative) literature and in institutional 
discourse. In the concluding section I reflect on whether a more holistic argumentation on 
expertise in European governance can be made, beyond the specific settings of agencies, IAs 
and OMC, and whether the language of constitutionalism is the appropriate solution for that. 
 
2. Expertise and (European) constitutionalism 
 
 
The debate on constitutionalism in the EU has long been framed in terms of “multi-level 
constitutionalism” and “constitutional pluralism”, which mainly focused on the relationship 
between the legal orders of the EU and its member states, and the resulting constitutional 
dialogue between the Court of the Justice of the EU (CJEU) and national constitutional 
courts.1 The “multi-level” or “pluralist” adjective mainly refers then to the way in which the 
																																								 																				
1 Ingolf Pernice, “Multilevel constitutionalism in the European Union”, European Law Review 27 (2002); Ingolf 
Pernice, “The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel constitutionalism in action”, Columbia Journal of European Law 15 
(2009); Neil Walker, “The idea of constitutional pluralism”, Modern Law Review 65 (2002); and Neil Walker, 
EU’s institutional design accommodates national diversity. The constitutionalism debate thus 
reflects a broader trend in EU studies which is characterised by two elements. 
 First, the predominant focus of EU studies on studying the way the EU has tried to 
accommodate national diversity has overshadowed questions about how European 
governance deals with functional differentiation. That modern society is increasingly 
characterised by functional differentiation is a well-established insight of social theory, going 
back to Weber, and particularly Talcott Parsons2 and Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory.3 
However, the consequences of such functional differentiation for governance in the European 
Union remain strongly understudied, and this despite the functionalist and “sector-by-sector” 
origin of the European integration project. Certainly, neo-functionalism featured as the front 
runner of European integration theory,4 but its institutional and democratic consequences 
have not been thought through, while normative debate on the EU were increasingly framed 
in terms of accommodating national differences, through the focus on intergovernmentalism 
versus supranationalism and the democratic deficit debate which evolved from “no demos” 
argumentation5 to conceptualising the European polity in terms of demoi-cracy.6 The limited 
attention to questions of functional differentiation within EU studies may be understood by 
the fact that sociology and social theory, in which theories of functional differentiation are 
routed, have played a less prominent role in EU studies than political science or law. It must 
be said, though, that even the (limited) sociological studies of the EU have tended to focus on 
the “vertical” multi-level challenges of the European polity, dealing with topics as European 
citizenship or the European public sphere,7 although sociological approaches to European 
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studies are now on the rise8 and sociology of knowledge9 as well as attention to functional 
differentiation is slowly trickling into the debate.10  
 Secondly, the EU’s institutional debate’s focus on the way national diversity is 
accommodated is related to a focus on conceiving politics and reflections on its democratic 
nature in terms of aggregating interests, whether territorially or functionally defined. The 
debate has focused on aggregating national, or other territorially defined levels of interests, 
via electoral representation, and expressed through parliament at European, national or 
regional level. In addition, the political science literature has paid extensive attention to 
functional interest aggregation via lobbying or civil society activity.11 However, modern 
governance is as much about knowledge-based claim making as about interest-based claim 
making.  
 The role of “knowledge” or “expertise” is discussed in several strands of the literature 
dealing with European policy making. However, it is not dealt with in a normative and 
holistic fashion in a way a constitutionalism perspective would provide. More particularly, 
the democratic challenges related to expertise and knowledge are only dealt with in the 
literature in a patchy way rather than by addressing the issue more systemically at the level of 
the polity as a whole. In the following sections, I will analyse how arguments about expertise 
and knowledge have been made in relation to specific European governance institutions. As 
will be illustrated in that institutional analysis, the different strands of literature can be 
distinguished by three different key dimensions of addressing the question of expertise and 
knowledge in European governance. 
 First, the focus can be either on expertise or on knowledge. Expertise assumes a level 
of authority, the possession of knowledge others don’t have, giving the privileged position to 
speak as an expert. Literature on expertise may focus on how experts are appointed and on 
the institutional settings authorising some actors to speak as experts, as well as on the relation 
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between different types of experts and expertise. The literature on knowledge in policy 
making instead is most often framed in terms of learning; knowledge is not the privilege of a 
particular group of experts, and the debate is particularly focused on the conditions under 
which learning occurs among the diversity of actors involved in policy making. 
 Secondly, studies of the role of expertise and knowledge in governance may be either 
analytical or normative. Hence, literature may deal with whether the inclusion of experts or 
the institutional setting for knowledge gathering ensures more efficient governance. At the 
same time, normative models have been proposed which place knowledge at the centre of 
democratic design. 
 Thirdly, and partially related to the two previous points, part of the literature fits with 
a societal understanding close to systems theory; while another part of the literature does not, 
or even explicitly distances itself from it. Indeed, a systems-theory perspective naturally 
raises questions in terms of expertise. The difficulties of communication between different 
sub-systems implies that expertise is located within each sub-system and rules of 
authorisation and recognition of expertise abide by the norms of each sub-system. Contrary to 
that, pragmatic approaches to reflexive governance ignore or deny the systemic nature of 
society and are based on the belief that learning can emerge among all policy actors; 
knowledge rather than expertise is the key word in this literature.  
 In the following section I will analyse how arguments regarding expertise and 
knowledge have been made in relation to different European governance mechanisms, 
exemplifying how different strands of the literature have remained rather separate. 
 
3. The debates on European agencies and impact assessments 
 
 
1. From agencies to impact assessments 
 
Expertise has always been central to the European integration process. The functional 
approach to European integration considered the participation of actors with particular 
expertise in the areas of sectoral integration more important than wider public participation, 
with the initial parliamentary assembly not being directly elected and only having advisory 
power. However, as a topic of both institutional and academic debate, expertise only really 
emerged during the 1990s. Particularly following the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) crisis, the EU’s regulatory framework was strongly contested for not respecting 
scientific standards and being biased by the interests of member states. In fact, the 
comitology system is based on a collaboration between the Commission and comitology 
committees which are composed of representatives from the national administrations. In the 
case of the “mad cow crisis”, the UK had managed through comitology to keep the European 
market open to its beef, which would not have been the case if decision making had relied 
more heavily on the available scientific evidence.  
Both the institutional and the academic debates that followed have focused on the 
importance of “independent expertise”, which was assumed to be found in the creation of 
independent agencies. However, the European agencies, which multiplied from the 1990s 
onwards, have not taken the form of independent regulatory agencies. They have no 
regulatory powers but act as executive or information agencies, either giving advice to the 
European Commission and comitology, or as a network of exchange of information aimed at 
improving implementation at a national level. Nevertheless, insofar as European agencies 
have a role in European regulation, their creation is based on a distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management. Agencies are supposed to provide “neutral”, “independent” 
risk assessment, while it is up to the political decision makers to ensure risk management by 
taking into account a broader variety of factors which includes both the independent risk 
assessment and consideration of other (national, functional) interests. Risk management is 
thus to be ensured by the European legislator (Commission, European Parliament (EP), and 
Council), or (much more regularly) by the Commission in interaction with comitology 
procedures. The relation between expertise and democracy in this case is based on the idea 
that information can be gathered neutrally and is then made available to politically 
accountable decision makers. The democratic process is ensured through the aggregation of 
interests via directly electoral representation (EP) or indirectly electoral representation 
(Council); or the mandate given by the legislator to the Commission. While most of the 
democratic accountability argument has focused on such territorial representation, it has also 
been recognised that aggregation of interests can be organised in a functional way, by way of 
consultation with stakeholders. However, from the “risk assessment/risk management” 
perspective, such participation should not be institutionalised via the agencies, which are 
supposed to gather “neutral” scientific advice (although some agencies have some 
stakeholders on their board). It is up to the European Commission to organise wider 
stakeholder participation; and it is up to the discretion of the Commission, and subsequently 
the EP and the Council (for legislation), or comitology committees (for comitology), to 
decide to what extent “neutral” information gathered through agencies and interest-based 
arguments gathered through Commission	consultation	procedures	are	taken	 into	account	 in	the	
final	political	decision. 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the debate on expertise in EU 
policy has shifted from the focus on agencies during the 1990s to a debate on sound evidence 
in the context of the Better Regulation agenda and, more particularly, the use of impact 
assessments. The debate on the European agencies, which function mainly as networks of 
national administrations rather than independent regulatory agencies, has more recently been 
framed in terms of the development of an “EU executive order”, “European administrative 
space”, or “European regulatory space”12, rather than in terms of their centrality in providing 
independent expertise for European regulatory action. At the same time, with the Better 
Regulation debate, the attention for expertise has turned to EU legislative action, whereas it 
was previously focused on delegated legislation, with the critique on comitology, and then on 
the implementation stage as it became centred around the role of the European agencies. The 
Better Regulation debate emerged gradually during the 1990s as a concern with the 
regulatory burden of EU intervention, but was placed higher on the political agenda in the 
context of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, merging different concerns; namely, regulatory burden, 
sound evidence for policy making, and more participatory procedures (the latter particularly 
also influenced by the parallel debate on the White Paper on European Governance).13 The 
most important instrument of the Better Regulation agenda has been the system of integrated 
impact assessments, which the Commission has systematically applied since 2003. Integrated 
IAs, considering the economic, social and environmental impacts of new proposals, are 
required for all main policy initiatives, and legislative action in particular. 
As in the agencies debate, the IA debate also (and particularly the official discourse 
about IAs) has to a great extent been framed in terms of a dichotomy between ensuring 
expertise on the one hand, and ensuring democratic participation and the aggregation of 
interests on the other. According to the 2015 Commission Guidelines on Better Regulation: 
Impact assessment is about gathering and analysing evidence to support policy making. In this process, 
it verifies the existence of a problem, identifies its underlying causes, assesses whether EU action is 
needed, and analyses the advantages and disadvantages of available solutions. IA promotes more 
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informed decision-making and contributes to Better Regulation which delivers the full benefits of 
policies at minimum cost while respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. However, 
IA is only an aid to policy-making/decision-making and not a substitute for it.14  
Similar statements were found in the previous iterations of the IA Guidelines, indicating that 
IAs provide “neutral” information which is then passed on to the political decision-making 
level.  
 Expertise for IAs is gathered in different ways: with “internal expertise” the 
Commission refers to knowledge available within the Commission itself, which can be 
gathered by the creation of an IA Steering Group, bringing together officials from 
Directorates General (DGs) relevant to the issue.15 “External expertise” is instead expected to 
come from expert groups and, in particular, scientific committees set up by the Commission 
and EU Agencies, while experts on the Commission expert website SINAPSE can also be 
used.16 At the same time, the EU’s system of IAs does recognise a role for interested parties 
within the IA process. In fact, compared to other countries and international organisations, 
the EU’s system of impact assessments pays more attention to ensuring the participation of 
stakeholders during the drafting of impact assessments.17 “Consultation with interested 
parties” is said to be: 
an essential tool for producing high quality and credible policy proposals. Consultation helps to ensure 
that policies are effective and efficient, and it increases the legitimacy of EU action from the point of 
view of stakeholders and citizens.18  
However, while it is acknowledged that stakeholders or “interested parties” can provide 
evidence, and can contribute to, for instance, “finding new ideas (brainstorming), collecting 
factual data, and validating a hypothesis”, their involvement also comes with the warning that 
“it is important to distinguish evidence from opinions”.19 Information provided by 
stakeholders is considered partisan and not objective, and it is therefore said that DGs should 
ensure “peer-reviewing, benchmarking with other studies and sensitivity analysis” in order to 
“significantly enhance the quality of data” and ensure “the robustness of the results”.20 At the 
same time, DGs should be sure to “engage all affected stakeholders” and “consult all relevant 
target groups”. Such wide involvement seems to have a representative dimension; it is only 
through wide participation of all stakeholders that the feasibility and legitimacy of policy 
proposals is ensured. The EU’s system of IAs thus does not entirely rely on “independent 
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expertise”, but also on expertise provided by interested parties. At the same time, it is 
assumed that some actors, such as scientific committees and agencies do provide such 
independent expertise (not requiring a similar check of “robustness” as in relation to 
information from stakeholders) and that the DG drafting the IA can provide a neutral 
overview of stakeholders’ position which can then be forwarded to the political decision-
making level, which can use this information at its discretion. 
 
2. Common features and differences of the agencies and IA debates 
Despite the time lapse between the start of the European agencies and the IA debates, they 
have many common features. More precisely, both debates struggle with two “pitfalls” that 
have structured the argumentation in a particular way; namely, a strong inspiration in the US 
experience with these governance tools, and a solid belief in the rational technical model of 
policy-making. 
 Both the debates on agencies and IAs at EU level have been strongly influenced by 
arguments concerning these governance tools in the US, where they have been used for a 
longer time. The debate on European agencies was strongly influenced by arguments about 
the assumed advantages of using independent regulatory agencies as a governance technique, 
particularly through the work of Giandomenico Majone.21 However, as the European 
agencies did not develop into real independent regulatory agencies, the American-inspired 
debate on the independence of expertise often sounds out of context. Many European 
agencies function as networks of national administrative authorities. The latter might also be 
institutionalised outside the main administration of ministries, on the basis of arguments of 
independence and expertise. However, such networks do not provide the EU agencies with 
regulatory decision-making power. Although some agencies have executive decision-making 
power, and some agencies may de facto weigh heavily on regulatory decisions due to their 
expert advice, the (final and formal) regulatory decision-making power remains in the hands 
of the political decision-making bodies, most often the Commission in interaction with 
comitology committees representing the member states’ interests. 
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 In a similar way, the experience with IAs in the US has been regularly referred to as 
reference point in the European debate,22 but IAs in the EU turned out to play a very different 
role than what they have traditionally been used for in the US. In the US, IAs are particularly 
used as a way to curb the enthusiasm and initiative of the regulatory agencies. It is a way for 
the President, accountable to the legislature, to control delegated regulation by independent 
agencies, a control mechanism which is particularly inspired by a deregulatory philosophy. In 
the EU, by contrast, IAs are not to be drafted by the agencies (which do not have the 
regulatory power) but by the European Commission. However, this applies in particular when 
the Commission takes legislative initiatives, unlike in the US where the legislator does not 
have to draft IAs. This raises very different constitutional questions than in the American 
case, as IAs in the EU are not simply a way in which the executive (regulatory independent 
agency) has to justify itself, but is a way of framing the legislative debate itself. It can be 
argued that IAs oblige the Commission to justify its initiatives in front of the co-legislators, 
which are the European Parliament and the Council. At the same time, the Commission 
(protected by its near exclusive right of legislative initiative) thus sets out the cognitive 
framework within which legislative proposals will be debated. Of course, the EP and Council 
can bring in totally different arguments. However, in the battle over “sound evidence” and 
“appropriate knowledge”, the EP and Council are modestly resourced in counter-arguing the 
expertise set out in IAs by the Commission. In an effort to counterbalance the Commission’s 
expertise, the EP created a Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value in 
January 2012, which became in 2014 part of a new European Parliamentary Research Service 
with 200 staff to support Members of Parliament with more evidence. While this may 
improve the EP’s ability to engage in the legislative debate on the basis of “sound evidence”, 
the Better Regulation agenda of the new Juncker Commission, presented in early 2015, may 
lead to the EP not even being able to put forward its “sound” arguments. The new 
Commission is strongly committed to a thinner regulatory agenda. Armed with IA and 
evaluation reports, the Commission First Vice-President, with the responsibility for Better 
Regulation, will proactively block initiatives from Commission DGs if considered not fitting 
the thin regulatory agenda. Hence, “sound evidence” provided in IA and evaluation reports, 
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particularly in terms of cost-benefit analysis,23 may be used against EU intervention without 
the EP having even a say over it. 
The second common pitfall in the debates on agencies and IAs is the belief in a the 
rational technical model of policy making, in which a clear line can be drawn between the 
gathering of neutral expertise and the subsequent political decision-making stage. Such a 
dichotomy between expertise and aggregating interests fails to acknowledge the many 
insights from science and technology studies, sociology of science and policy analysis, so 
that such a strict distinction does not stand the test of reality.24 Interest-based participants also 
possess knowledge and evidence and definitely make knowledge-based claims. There has 
also been an increased “politicisation of science” as opposed interest groups make claims on 
the basis of contradictory scientific arguments using only those supporting their position.25 In 
turn, this development makes public that science does not provide the single truth. As a 
consequence, the neutrality of science and expertise cannot be assumed, and there is plenty of 
evidence that science can be bent by special interests.26  
The IA debate has acknowledged that interest groups also provide information, but 
while it is cautious about the bias of such information, it is less critical of the politics of the 
gathering of assumed neutral and scientific expertise and interests at play therein. In the 
agency debate, the belief in the separation of knowledge gathering and interest politics is 
even more clear-cut. Yet, over the last years, criticism from civil society organisation and 
from the Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman on issues of conflict of interest in 
the functioning of the European agencies has undermined the normative underpinnings of the 
agencies institutional set-up. 
 
4. The debate on the OMC 
 
While the debates on agencies and IAs show many similarities in their arguments on 
expertise, a very different approach to expertise in European governance emerged in the 
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debate on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The core of this debate developed in the 
first half of the 2000s,27 and thus somewhat in between the key moments of attention of the 
agency and IA debates. In 2000, the Lisbon Summit had put the OMC centrally on the agenda 
as a new governance tool. Instead of relying on binding EU intervention, the OMC is based 
on the definition of European guidelines, for which the member states then have to set out 
national action plans explaining how they intend to implement or have implemented these 
guidelines. These action plans are subsequently assessed at the European level (which may 
lead to revision of the guidelines) and may be combined with a process of specific 
recommendations addressed to the member states. This cyclical process is combined with the 
definition of benchmarks and measurable indicators allowing comparison of best practice. 
Moreover, the OMC is said to be based on a “fully decentralised approach”, in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity in which the Union, the member states, the regional and local levels, 
as well as the social partners and civil society, are actively involved, using variable forms of 
partnership. 
In both the institutional and academic debates on the OMC, the question of 
“expertise” is, rather, framed in terms of knowledge and exchange of information. The OMC 
is conceptualised as a process of learning. From this perspective, all actors in the process are 
assumed to learn and be capable of providing knowledgeable input. Unlike in the agency and 
IA debates, there is no strong normative argumentation on the assumed benefit of separating 
the “neutral gathering of expertise” from the political decision making. Both are assumed to 
emerge through the same bottom-up process. In fact, within the OMC, it is difficult to oppose 
the traditional democratic aggregation of interests based on an electoral mandate to the 
neutral gathering of expertise, since parliamentary involvement in the OMC is weak. At EU 
level, the OMC is driven by the Commission and the (European) Council, with the EP almost 
entirely absent. One has therefore argued in favour of strengthening the role of national 
parliaments in the OMC.28 However, while they can be involved in the implementation of the 
OMC at the national level, ensuring involvement in the drafting of the EU level guidelines is 
much more difficult. Hence the OMC’s discourse on the importance of bottom-up 
participation and stakeholder involvement. Whether the OMC’s decentralised setting really 
ensures at the same time the gathering of knowledge and the representative involvement of all 
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stakeholders has been an issue of academic inquiry, with some evidence of increased 
stakeholder participation, but leading to an overall picture of an OMC that is mainly 
technocratically driven by administrators at national and EU level.29 
At the same time, a more theoretical academic debate on the OMC developed around 
ideas of reflexive governance and the model of directly-deliberative polyarchy (DDP). 
Reflexive governance has been discussed in both policy analysis, particularly in 
environmental policy, and legal theory, particularly based on Gunther Teubner’s autopoietic 
theory of reflexive law.30 The common ground is the focus on policy and law making as a 
cyclical and permanent learning process in which experience with the policy or law in 
practice leads to amendment of that policy or norm (first-order learning) and in which the 
process of policy and law making itself can be revised (second-order learning).31 Most 
authors on reflexive law and governance stress the importance of a wide decentralised 
participation in these learning processes. At the same time, theories on reflexive governance 
or law are often proposed as analytical, describing the changing nature of modern policy and 
law making. When they are more normative, it is mainly in proposing the conditions under 
which learning would best occur. Arguments about the democratic nature of reflexive 
governance are often made implicitly rather than explicitly. Decentralised and participatory 
processes ensure the required knowledge and expertise for learning. That they ensure at the 
same time democratic involvement is often assumed but not strongly argued. 
However, the OMC has also been said to be an example of DDP. The model of DDP 
is explicitly proposed as a design for modern democratic governance. DDP is a democratic 
ideal that is based on the idea that: 
local-, or more exactly, lower-level actors (nation state or national peak organizations of various kinds; 
regions, provinces or sub-national associations within these, and so on down to the level of whatever 
kind of neighbourhood the problem in question makes relevant) are granted autonomy to experiment 
with solutions of their own devising within broadly defined areas of public policy. In return they 
furnish central or higher-level units with rich information regarding their goals as well as the progress 
they are making towards achieving them, and agree to respect in their actions framework rights of 
democratic procedure.32  
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31 Voss, Bauknecht, and Kemp, ibid. 
32 Oliver Gerstenberg and Charles Sabel, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?”, 
in Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, eds. Christian Joerges and Renaud Dehousse (Oxford: 
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The system is “directly-deliberative” since “citizens must examine their own choices in the 
light of the relevant deliberations and experiences of others”33 – in contrast to other 
discursive ideas of democracy of deliberation by an administrative or political elite. The 
system is “polyarchic” due to the permanent disequilibrium created by the grant of substantial 
powers of initiative to lower-level units.34 The democratic claims of DDP are akin to ideas of 
participatory democracy35 and deliberative democracy in that it focuses on direct 
participation and deliberation in terms of rational argument. DDP aims at decentralization 
“down to the level of whatever kind of neighbourhood the problem in question makes 
relevant”,36 and postulates “direct participation by and reason-giving between and among free 
and equal citizens”37 as a normative ideal. “There is a presumption in favour of equal 
membership for affected parties – open meetings, with equal rights to participate in 
discussion and decision-making for all affected parties.”38  
DDP does not fit well with the concept of expertise. Instead, knowledge is to emerge 
through a bottom-up process in which all actors can learn. However, DDP underestimates the 
systemic nature of knowledge and society. As argued in systems theory, society is constituted 
of sub-systems with their own language, making interaction between these sub-systems not 
entirely impossible but very difficult. Gerstenberg and Sabel argue instead that: 
local knowledge is neither tacit nor fully and self-referentially systematic. Co-ordination among local 
collaborators is necessary because of the diversity of their views and possible because . . . the 
exploration of the ambiguities internal to each shades into exchange with the others. But as local co-
ordination yields new ambiguities of its own, there is both need and possibility for inter-local exchange 
through a new centre that frames discussion and re-frames it as results permit.39  
However, the evidence of governance practices, in particular in the context of the EU, shows 
that the heterogeneity of participants40 within local units emerges far less spontaneously than 
DDP seems to suggest, given the systemic expertise that is required. Moreover, a new centre 
at a higher level that allows inter-local exchange may indeed provide opportunity to reframe 
discussion, but the (partial) self-referentiality of sub-systems implies that, if not consciously 
institutionalised, there will be a tendency for such a higher-level centre to be created within 
the sub-system rather than creating deliberation across sub-systems. As the OMC illustrates, 
European governance tends to occur through auto-referential deliberation between functional 
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actors structured by the language of each sub-system, rather than as a bottom-up process 
based on citizen participation and a rather spontaneous process of cross-system interaction. 
 
5. Conclusion: Back to constitutionalism for a holistic approach to expertise? 
 
The analysis above shows how arguments about the role of expertise and knowledge in 
European governance have been made in relation to specific institutional settings and by 
different parts of the literature which have not interacted much. Set on track with the debate 
on European agencies, which was focused on the (regulatory) implementation stage, the 
debate on expertise got extended to the legislative stage by the topic of IAs. In both cases, 
normative discourse has been based on the idea of a separation between the democratic 
aggregation of interests on the one hand, and ensuring the input of independent expertise in 
policy making on the other. A different approach predominated in relation to the third 
European governance structure that engendered arguments about expertise and democracy, 
namely, the OMC. In this context, both expertise and interest representation are assumed to 
emerge bottom-up through the same process.  
 None of the three governance mechanisms around which arguments of expertise have 
developed received much attention in the debate on constitutionalism. This raises the 
question whether constitutionalism can provide a more holistic approach to the patchy 
arguments about expertise and democracy which have been framed in function of specific 
institutional settings and by separate literatures. 
 Neil Walker describes the essence of constitutionalism by its “meta-political function 
of shaping the domain of politics broadly conceived – of literally constituting the body 
politic.”41 It is: 
that species of practical reasoning which, in the name of some defensible locus of common interest, 
concerns itself with the organization and regulation of those spheres of collective decision-making 
deemed relevant to the common interest in a manner that is adequately informed by the common 
interest.42  
Within the context of the nation state, constitutionalism functioned as a cluster concept, 
accumulating various distinct layers of situated constitutional practice, namely, juridical (self-
constituted legal order), politico-institutional (idea of a secular delimited political realm, free 
from deference to particular interests), popular (democratic self-constitution), and societal 
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(idea of an integrated society, whether “thin” political society or “thicker” cultural society).43 
However, much of contemporary governance does not correspond to the expectation of such 
holistic constitutionalism.  
 The debate on multi-level constitutionalism has indeed more recently evolved from 
multi-level constitutionalism senso stricto (focused on the EU; and with the option to anchor 
the multi-levels within democratic processes of the nation state) to multi-level 
constitutionalism senso lato, paying attention to the complexity of modern governance which 
is often global, transnational, partially based on private regulation, and characterised by 
heterarchical networks (often difficult to anchor within the hierarchical nation state 
democratic process). The debate on such multi-actor (rather than multi-level) 
constitutionalism has so far mainly been initiated in relation to transnational private 
regulation.44 However, multi-actor governance plays at all levels, including within the nation 
state, and where public and private sectors interact. In fact, the key challenge of modern 
governance may well be how knowledge, expertise, and cognitive frameworks, which are 
often functionally defined and increasingly transnational, influence policy making. Put 
differently, the challenge of multi-actor constitutionalism is how to regulate the interaction 
between the provision of knowledge and expertise on the one hand, and interest-based 
politics which answers to the meta-constitutional principle of self-governance on the other. 
So far, the literature on multi-level constitutionalism senso lato has not been framed in these 
terms. 
 At the same time, the literature on transnational private regulation raises also the 
question how far the language and meta-political function of constitutionalism can reach. In a 
special issue on transnational private regulation of the Journal of Law and Society, the guest 
editors, Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi and Linda Senden, investigate the constitutional 
challenge of such private governance.45 They argue that private-regulatory power can 
significantly enhance capacity for developing and implementing public-regarding norms. The 
legitimacy of such private governance may often not be found in public law forms that 
traditionally justify regulatory intervention (above all linkage to electoral politics, but also 
proceduralisation and judicial accountability), but in private law forms and competitive 
structures. However, while these might provide legitimating discourses, they do so in a much 
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more sectoral way, and one wonders whether it can really live up to the constitutional meta-
political function of providing a framework ensuring the common interest. Although the 
authors refer briefly to the meta-principle of the right to self-governance,46 which they argue 
might be organised also in ways other than electoral politics, most of the proposed 
legitimating discourses stand far from traditional constitutional guarantees. 
 The analysis by Bomhoff and Meuwese in the same special issue may therefore 
appear more honestly modest but is at the same time even more disappointing from a 
constiutitonalist perspective.47 Here the constitutionalist language is entirely absent. They 
analyse the meta-norms that develop through different disciplinary and professional lenses, 
looking in particular at private international law and Better Regulation. However, in the 
absence of a constitutionalist discourse as benchmark, it may be too easily taken for granted 
that such meta-norms (for instance, on consultation requirements in Better Regulation) live 
up to democratic benchmarks.  
 Bringing this back to the analysis above, the debates on agencies, IAs and OMC have 
all engendered legitimating discourses and, in the language of Bomhoff and Meuwese, meta-
norms among the policy makers involved. None of them, though, has provided a broader 
normative framework in a way holistic constitutionalism would have done. Not only are these 
legitimating discourses limited to a narrow range of actors, but neither do they reach as far as 
a narrative “constituting the body politic”. In the agency debate at least, the broader 
constitutional challenge has partially been raised with reference to principles of (global) 
administrative law (which finally links into electoral politics), while the democratic concern 
in the context of the OMC has been raised via reflexive governance and deliberative 
democracy. The Better Regulation debate, instead, has largely developed its own meta-
norms, largely independent from constitutionalist language and concerns. In the absence of 
the constitutionalist language, such narratives risk providing simply a legitimating discourse 
for functional governance captured by particular interests.  
 At the same time, given the complexity of modern governance (heterarchical and 
often transnational), “traditional” holistic constitutionalism is clearly a framework from the 
past. The challenge is to rethink constitutionalism in such a way that its core meta-function of 
shaping the domain of politics in the common interest can be ensured, based on the 
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acknowledgment that policy making is as much about knowledge-based as about interest-
based claim making. 
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